How the maritime industries can partner in America's overall transportation system in the coming age of freight plethora.
A Project of the
Gulf/Rivers Intermodal Partnership (GRIP)
Produced by the Secretariat
Central Region
Maritime Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
September 2002
Vision i
Summary ii
2X3X 1
Project Where the Rudders Meet the Road
3
Plan of Action
(ConBINE) 16
Plan of Action (DAVE) 18
Terms & Acronyms
19
Meeting Feedback Appendix A
Grip Tenn-Tom Sub-Region A 1
Grip West Gulf Sub-Region A 3
Grip East Gulf Sub-Region A 5
Grip Lower Mississippi Sub-Region A 7
Grip Mid-Gulf Sub-Region A 9
Common/Considered Common Assets,
Liabilities, and Needs
Appendix B
Inland Waterway Systems
Appendix C
Inland
Barge Transportation
Appendix D
National Defense
Appendix E
Comparison Of The
Benefits
Appendix F
Participants Alphabetical Listing
Appendix G
Participants
Sorted by Nexus Appendix H
Participants Sorted by Sub-Region Appendix I
Short Sea
A domestic maritime intermodal system operated by the private sector on the
U.S. Gulf coast, seamlessly connected to other land and water transportation hubs capable of moving sufficient freight in partnership with the land modes to substantially reduce predicted highway congestion and thereby contribute to the economy and ecology of the nation.
The required infrastructure realized by the provisions of consensus among federal, state, and local governments and port authorities.
The required vessel realized through the efforts of the public and private maritime communities to assure reasonable profitability while safeguarding the principles of the Jones Act and conforming to relevant safety standards.
Inland Rivers
A domestic maritime container-on-barge system on the Mississippi River system (including the Ohio River, Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway) capable of moving sufficient freight in partnership with the land modes to substantially reduce predicted congestion on highways and thereby contribute to the economy and ecology of the nation.
The required infrastructure realized by the provisions of consensus among the federal, state, and local governments, port authorities, and private industries.
The required
vessel realized through the efforts of the public and private maritime
communities to assure reasonable profitability while safeguarding the
principles of the Jones Act and conforming to relevant safety standards.
Summary
A growing gap exists between land mode capacity and transportation demand. If the gap is allowed to widen further, the transportation system will become congested and thereby, in varying degrees, negatively impact the economy and national security.
If and when such land mode congestion occurs, for the regions that are fortunate enough to be able to utilize it, the maritime mode is the most practical, economical, ecologically benevolent, and sustainable alternative. Nearly 100 maritime experts who participated in Project Where theRudders Meet the Roads( RMR ) agree that the marine mode can offer significant relief from future highway congestion.
To establish orderly, domestic waterborne systems, assistance will be required. Surprisingly, a majority of the Rudders Meet the Roads participants stated that funding was not their most urgent need. Rather, "leadership" was what they said they needed most. Since modal specialization is so pervasive in today's culture, these experts counsel that the new leadership must be overarching.
The need for innovative funding was a very close second to the need for creative leadership. The coastal sea lanes and inland waterways routes are essentially in place. Fortuitously, the cost of converting or constructing domestic terminals will be significantly less than that required for new international trade terminals. The vessels will be costly, and therein lies the need for innovative means of financing.
This report does not suggest that the government’s efforts should be limited to the GRIP region. Clearly it should encompass all regions that face potentially severe congestion on the land modes and have the necessary maritime assets to establish short sea shipping and/or container-on-barge services. However, the maritime community of the Gulf South or the Gulf/Rivers Intermodal Partnership (GRIP) region possesses an overwhelming abundance of maritime assets amid immense industrial and agricultural markets. As such it is a most fertile venue for a program to renew domestic short sea services and improve utilization of container-on-barge services. The freight most indigeIn contemplating the two domestic systems, container-on-barge and short sea shipping, the synergistics make it tempting to pattern a single interlinked system. However, there are many substantial distinctions, so it will be best to allow each system to develop separately, unhampered by the growing pains of the other. The systems can merge effectively with maturity.
The existence of domestic waterborne systems will have profound national security advantages: The sea-going vessels and the crews will be merchant marine assets in time of war. Less congested highways and railroads will be available for emergency use. The waterborne systems will provide an alternative transportation system in the event of terrorist attacks.
The side benefit of NAFTA and South American trade should not be overlooked. Short sea domestic vessels will have much in common with those engaged in short sea trade routes and the two should be able to operate to each other's advantage.
This report recommends an effort to increase the use of the maritime mode in the overall transportation system. The transformations are initially regional in nature with the prospect of becoming multi-regional. They are also multi-agency, multi-level of government, industries/governments partnerships.
The Plans of Action call for an infrastructure effort utilizing the federal/ states consensus concept, Consensus Building for Intermodal Network Efficiency (Conbine ) and a Domestic Affordable Vessel Effort (DAVE).
THE 2X3X FACTOR
A growing gap exists between land mode capacity and transportation demand. The gap is predicted to widen with eventual severe consequences for the land modes and the nation in general.
Critical
transportation congestion occurs when a series of circumstances combine to
create unusually severe jams. One recent example of this was the immediate
aftermath of the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger. Two highly efficient
railroads combined and, for an extended period thereafter, became less
efficient. In the 1970s the former Soviet Union purchased more grain than it
could receive or the United States could deliver. Both countries'
transportation systems were more than adequate for normal demands, but when
overtaxed, all systems experienced gridlock. The fact that the United States
has the world's best overall transportation system does not make it immune to
the cancer of congestion. Indeed there are developments which could create a
perfect transportation jam.
The 2x3x demand factor is shorthand for a two- to three-fold increase in the overall demand for transportation services in a 20 to 25 year period. Without challenge, in the previous decade, expert forecasters made such predictions. If such demands for transportation services can be met, they will usher immense opportunities for all transportation providers and assure national economic wellbeing. However, this unprecedented opportunity is mined with unprecedented requirements. Failure to meet the requirements equates to default, and that could well be ruinous to transportation providers and to the overall health of the nation. This doubling or tripling of demand includes both domestic and international transportation services. In varying degrees, it affects all sections of the United States.
Arguably, 2x3x is the most important factor in transportation planning for the next two decades. The records of the first six years of freight movements in the 1995–2020 demand period verify that, if maintained, 2x3x multiplication is, on the average, in process.
The prospects of 2x3x become worrisome because, while the general transportation demand is rising along the 2x3x curve, there is not a corresponding escalation in the capacity of the nation's transportation infrastructure or in its efficiency. With neither productivity gains nor infrastructure expansions keeping pace, much of the existing infrastructure is approaching, at, or past the point of diminishing efficiency. This is not to say the entire infrastructure is overloaded, but its interdependency is threatened. In a transportation chain, the weakest links govern the system. Fixing the problem is more than a simple matter of will. Financial priorities compete within the enormity of 2x3x demand needs, but even if funding were not a consideration, environmental practicality would continue to be a determinant.
A leap in productivity of 2x3x proportions, hypothetically, could rescue the situation. The containerization revolution, which began in the 1950s, tripled ocean carrier productivity by the 1980s. However, viewed as a part of the continuum, the container revolution was an isolated spike among otherwise gradual increases in productivity. Technological innovations doubtlessly will assist in meeting the 2x3x service demand, but nothing appears to be on the horizon which will repeat the breakthroughs of the 1950s.
So there are no easy, overall solutions: If the infrastructure is tripled, communities and habitats are compromised. If the infrastructure is not enlarged highways and railroads and ports are clogged with impeded, emission belching propulsion units. There is no guarantee, or even credible indications, that innovation will solve the dilemma. Sheer willpower coupled with the "do more with less" ethic will be inadequate under the circumstances. However, "do more with what you have" offers a practical promise – if the “what you have” includes the totality of capacity of a truly intermodal transportation system.
The practicality of using the entire
infrastructure to the best overall advantage is the one solution that can be
most beneficial to all modes. The 2x3x factor has not impacted the modes of
transportation equally, and will not do so. The most under-utilized portion of
the infrastructure is the maritime sector. It is practical, economical, and
ecologically sensitive. There are 25,000 miles of waterways that are not near
capacity, some with a growth rate as low as one percent. The inland and
deep-sea ports in general have unused capacity. Thus, uniquely, the maritime
mode is naturally and professionally willing and able to be an intermodal
partner with land modes in the great 2x3x challenge of Century 21.
PROJECT WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS (RMR)
Nearly one hundred transportation and maritime experts from the Gulf/South envision alleviation of potential congestion on parallel rail and highway routes by:
The transportation and maritime experts who participated in Project Where the Rudders Meet the Roads (RMR) were intellectual contributors at one of five 1-day RMR sessions. Participants came from regional academic institutions, deep sea marine carriers, shallow draft marine carriers, metropolitan planning organizations, not-for-profit professional transportation organizations, port authorities, state departments of transportation, and U.S. Department of Transportation agencies.
The RMR participants' briefings included the following:
Basic Objective: The Gulf\Rivers Intermodal Partnership (GRIP) instituted RMR to further the efficiency of the Na-tion's overall transportation system by incorporation of the maritime modes as intermodal partners with the land modes. As the name implies, the project investigated how commercial U.S.-flag vessels could be used to advantage as a complement to highway and railroad transportation providers in the U.S. domestic trade. Two distinct types of domestic shipping are contemplated: short sea shipping and container-on-barge (COB).
Modal Partnership: RMR is not motivated by the type of modal competition which the marine mode gradually began losing when the flange wheel on iron rails spread across the country in the 19th Century and which intensified in the 20th Century with the rubber tire on the paved road. Rather, the forecasts for unprecedented increases in overall transportation demand signal a new day of general freight plethora. In the plethora environment, the water modes should be viewed, not as rivals of the land modes, but as
Unitized Shipments: The transportation of unitized shipments (containers and/ or truck trailers) between U.S. city-ports located on either the inland waterways or coastal sea-lanes most accurately should be compared to railroad piggyback service. In the services envisioned by RMR, the marine carriers' customers would be originating or final land carriers, not the shippers or consignees of the freight. Stated otherwise, the marine carrier would normally be the middle partner with one or more land carriers serving the origin and the destination. Several types of unitized freight are easily identified as being ideal for domestic waterborne carriage. To name a few:
After the briefings, all RMR participants were asked to name what assets their sub-region possessed that would be of benefit to an all-mode intermodal transportation system in the new era of freight plethora. Discussion and consensus building were followed by similar procedures to determine what liabilities were present and which would be detrimental to the establishment of domestic waterborne shipping systems. This set the stage for the final portion: What is needed to establish a fully intermodal transportation system and how can these needs be met?
The main body of this report does not attempt to digest all of the valuable information that was contributed; however, much of it is incorporated in various appendices. This report focuses on three ubiquitous observations that form the basis of the conclusions and subsequent recommendations.
NEED FOR MARITIME RECOGNITION
Industry principals feel that neither the public, nor to a certain extent, government leaders/decision-makers understand nor appreciate the contributions or potentials of the maritime modes. The participants opined that this liability would be a substantial impediment to maritime participation in the 2x3x challenge.
This viewpoint included the Federal level and was seen mostly as a lack of overall coordination. The various agencies were cited for what was perceived to be fractured responsibilities. A considerable number of participants felt that a single maritime agency would be beneficial; however, this was not a consensus.
The lack of recognition viewpoint carried over to the state government level. The participants understood that, while the state departments of transportation (SDOT) have experienced a relatively recent metamorphosis from highway bureaus, the transition is not automatic. It was readily acknowledged that the major mandate of the SDOTs remains that of road building and maintenance. There was considerable discussion about the various methods that the individual SDOTs use to meet their non-highway responsibilities.
At the local government and Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) level the integration of multimodal and intermodal transportation planning is even less evident. While some MPO’s have recently begun to recognize the impact of goods movement on the overall transportation system effectiveness, many others have not. Since most deepwater ports and many inland ports are located in urbanized areas, the recognition of intermodal solutions to congestion problems must receive wider attention. Fortunately, the visibility of freight and its impact on the nation’s landside networks are on the rise at all levels. This is evidenced by the following: the Latin American Trade and Transportation Study, the National Freight Study (being conducted by the Federal Highway Administration), and the increased number of Transportation Research Board and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials committees looking at various freight issues.
The RMR participants did not spare themselves. They conceded that traditionally, the maritime professionals have fostered a distinct culture that now impedes reciprocal understanding.
Lack of recognition by the public and by consumers was also cited. It was understood that consumers are completely indifferent as to what mode is used as long as freight deliveries are dependable and economical. The RMR participants pointed out that the other modes were far more visible to the public than ships, towboats, and barges. Thus, to the degree that citizens and their representatives tend to support one mode over another, lack of visibility is a maritime liability.
NEED FOR CREATIVE LEADERSHIP
The increased use of the water mode is virtually inescapable due to the growing demands of 2x3x on the land-based modes. This inevitability can be seen in today’s increased interest in waterborne domestic shipping. The question is how to integrate the water mode in an orderly, and therefore effective, way. Without overarching leadership, at best, advocates of fully partnered intermodalism will be mere theoreticians. At worst, disorderly, inefficient intermodalism will emerge as a matter of necessity as a result of near gridlock. The primary key to achieving orderly, highly effective intermodalism, according to a majority of the RMR participants, will be an emergence of creative leadership. This should not be construed as a negative criticism of current or past leadership on any level. Rather it is consistent with the observation noted above about lack of maritime recognition. In a constructive context, the RMR participants recognized that modal specialization is all-pervasive in today's transportation culture. This contributes to an overall lack of transportation knowledge breadth. The gap between modal experts is a liability to rationalized multi-modal operations.
In essence, these maritime experts conceded that they did not know how to be fully effective in assisting truck and/ or rail carriers. However, implicit in this admission was the conclusion that their land mode counterparts are equally unprepared to take full advantage of the maritime mode as a transportation partner. This impasse therefore calls for the emergence of an overarching or omni team leader.
This new leadership must synthesize both the overall needs and the individual modal capabilities into a collaborative system. At minimum, the collaborators must include the heads of the appropriate Federal modal agencies with guidance and direction from the Secretarial level. Equally essential, the new leadership must include the heads of the respective state departments of transportation. Leaders of the port authority industry, most of whom are employees of the states, counties, cities, or navigation districts, will provide the needed congruity. As indicated above, the MPO’s must also be represented. Last but by no means least, the leaders of the transportation private industries must be included.
Overarching leadership will be able to appreciate all modes with bias toward none. It must view “factions” as “fractions” that can be united into one intermodal whole whose effectiveness is far greater than the sum of the parts. The task of the leadership would be to mold a team that would take intermodalism to its next logical plateau: Today's approach of conducting a succession of specialized procedures should be transformed into a collective lateral process that best utilizes the inherent advantages of each mode.
In effect, the RMR participants did not claim that the present systems are leaderless, but what they asked was that the new partnership be "leaderful."
NEED FOR INNOVATIVE FUNDING IN GENERAL
In some respects, the funding needed to implement domestic shipping on the Gulf or on the southern waterways will be fairly minimal; however, in other respects it will be considerable; in the net, it will be substantial. Compared to other alternatives, it will be a bargain, but it will not be free. Financing will pose a problem for governments and private industries, not because the levels are insurmountable, but because the new paradigm requires innovation and new thinking in funding methods.
The RMR participants considered the current methods of private and public financing inadequate for the tasks of establishing efficient, economical, systemic short sea waterborne service. This is also true of container-on-barge service, but perhaps to a lesser extent. Innovative financing combined with current conventional and governmental assistance will be required. Because there are many variations, it is impractical to describe in detail the many types of vessels that conceptually can be used in the domestic trade. Although most already exist, some are only on drawing boards. Since the types of vessels determine the types of terminals, a basic notional description of a short sea shipping system and a container-on-barge system follows.
Short Sea Domestic Shipping System Factors
The "highways" to be utilized are the sea-lanes of the Gulf of Mexico. Obviously, these are available at reasonable cost to responsible operators. The "roads and streets" are the connecting channels. Essentially, the short sea system would not need any channel improvements. The availability of these assets with significant excess capacity, coupled with the system's economical and ecological advantages, are the paramount reasons for advocating maritime intermodalism as a logical partner to land-based transportation. Such use is in keeping with the injunction of doing the most with existing assets.
The terminals should not present a major financial obstacle to establishing domestic short sea systems. Because the conceived systems will only handle unitized freight, i.e., trailers and/or containers, domestic roll-on/ roll-off terminals can be less elaborate than most conventional ocean marine terminals. In many cases, otherwise obsolete terminals can be converted. The major cost would then be the removal of warehouses and buildings and the creation of open storage space, plus some added costs associated with roll-on/roll-off operations.
Photograph Courtesy of Foss Maritime Company
THE MV DELTA MARINER
A U.S.-FLAG, SHORT
SEA VESSEL
The success of a short sea system will be contingent upon reliability, cost, and overall transit time. The big investment will center mostly on the ships that would be needed. It will be absolutely necessary to have frequent, scheduled departures and arrivals, and this translates into a fleet of sufficient size to assure that the overall transit time compares favorably with the conventional modes.
The number of ships depends upon numerous, obvious factors, e.g., the length of the run, speed of the ships, and the required service frequency.
Most likely, the vessels in short sea service would be roll on/roll off ships.
Purchase of self-propelled, conventional, ferry-type vessels would constitute the smallest initial investment. Conventional sea-going barges pulled by conventional sea-going tugs may be unacceptably slow for systemic short sea use; however, an integrated or articulated vessel system (a barge and tug constructed so that they fit together and thereby form virtually one vessel) should not be overlooked. Under such a system, barges could be in port always ready for loading, and the tug units would enter port, change barges and proceed out with no delays attributable to cargo handling. These systems would have a higher initial cost, but could prove more economical overall.
Riverine Container-on-barge Shipping System Factors
The waterways of the Gulf South, the systems of the Mississippi River, Tennes-see-Tombigbee Waterway, and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway are heavily utilized for weighty,voluminous bulk freight. As with the short sea system, the availability of these riverine assets (which are not near capacity), coupled with the system's economical and ecological advantages are the paramount reason for advocating maritime intermodalism.
Photograph Courtesy of Osprey Line
AN INLAND BARGE MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS
River terminals do not present a major financial obstacle to increased con-tainer-on-barge operations. However, there are some major differences between terminals of the short sea trade and those of inland container-on-barge terminals. Currently, shallow draft movements have handled only containers, not trailers, making cranage necessary. This is not to say that roll-on/roll-off container and trailer operations should not be considered in the future, but for immediate planning purposes, only freight containers are contemplated. In any case, the inland COB terminal can be less elaborate than high-volume international container terminals at deepwater ports. Both types of terminals have common prerequisites for open storage space, cranage and container handling equipment.
COB operations can function with modified conventional barges and conventional towboats. Until such time as specially designed COB equipment is required, it can be presumed that the needed vessels can be obtained and modified from the existing stock of U.S.-flag towboats and barges.
As with short sea service, the number of barges and towboats must be adequate to meet the shippers' schedules. It is noteworthy that in the past, lower tariffs were expected to be a powerful incentive for COB shippers. Price was supposed to offset slower transit times. However, these ventures in mid-America failed. Arguably, a failure cycle was created when reliability was frusished volumes. Today's COB operators find that they can compete on service. Even though it moves slower, a timely delivery of one barge load of containers can work out to be algebraically time-competitive with a drawn out series of truck deliveries. As with short sea service, an expanded COB market will require an adequate number of vessels to maintain a viable schedule.
Proscribed Funding Concepts
It is far beyond the scope of Project Where the Rudders Meet the Roads to recommend what form innovative financing should take. It is enough to opine that new means of financing will be needed or the systems will not be created in sufficient time to prove effective with the 2x3x onslaught. However there are concepts that RMR participants feel should not be considered.
There was little sentiment to weaken the Jones Act provisions. To the extent that such sentiment was expressed, it was more of a manifestation of frustration at being unable to buy a vessel at a price that could be competitively employed. It was hoped that some alternative could be found to achieve the real objective: a less expensive, competitive U.S.-flag vessel in the domestic short sea trade.
There was no sentiment to divert Federal funding from dedicated highways or railroads to maritime missions. The sentiment was that if maritime intermodalism is important, it must stand financially on its own.
Build and Charter Program
One innovative funding suggestion is that the Federal government should, in cooperation with the industry, design the prototype vessel(s) that would be needed to establish the needed domestic trades. The economics of scale would thus come into play. Charters would then be fixed and the vessels would be built. The vessels could also be sold, if that was preferable to the parties. It should be noted that the United States is quite competitive as a ship builder of smaller vessels such as those under consideration.
National Considerations
The government's maritime intermodal efforts should encompass all regions that face potentially
severe congestion on the land modes and have the physical attributes to
establish ameliorative short sea shipping and/or container-on-barge services.
Specifically, cooperative efforts for short sea operations among all coasts and
for COB operations on the whole Mississippi system should be encouraged. The
GRIP region can contribute to and benefit from any national maritime intermodal
effort. Some other regions may face more serious congestion now or in the near
future, but the GRIP states have collectively more maritime assets than any
other region. A broad multi- regional approach would energize the economies of
scale and would best utilize GRIP regional expertise in national planning.
Photograph Courtesy of Osprey Line
A MOVEMENT OF MILITARY ROLLING EQUIPMENT
National Security Considerations
There are at least four national security considerations that should be noted. First, a domestic shipping system will be a powerful asset when mobilizations and/or deployments are necessary. Experience teaches that the military must initially move large amounts of materiel to U.S. ports. These movements are appropriately called "surges." They are superimposed upon normal commercial traffic. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, surge movements created some congestion, but it was manageable. However, the same surge superimposed upon tomorrow's 2x3x traffic would choke the system to the detriment of both commercial and military shippers. Therefore, having a maritime complement to rail and highway transportation could be the difference between a successful or a failed deployment.
The contemplated domestic waterborne systems will employ skilled seamen and officers in new billets. As such, they would comprise a much-needed addition to the reserve manpower supply. Again, we draw upon the Desert War experience where 95 percent of the cargoes moved by ship. The supply of mariners during that conflict was stretched. Arguably, the supply may not have been adequate for a longer sustained conflict. In a future conflict, the manpower pool would be enlarged if it included robust domestic shipping industries. In addition, it would be possible to move vessels normally engaged in domestic trade into overseas military operations. In the Second World War, the U.S.-flag intercoastal and short sea fleets provided a substantial proportion of the vessels called into wartime service.
Terrorism is another consideration. Clearly the transportation infrastructure is a prime target. Unfortunately, there are countless ways that terrorists could impede traffic for long periods of time, causing economic and security distress. If, for example, a series of bridges were destroyed by terrorists, the availability of maritime assets would be imperative. Recalling New York on 9/11, ferryboats, tour boats, and tugboats were all pressed into service when the conventional transportation services were severed.
NAFTA and Latin American Implications
This RMR report dwells upon domestic commerce; i.e., freight movements from one point in the United States to another in the United States. However, the position of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico is particularly advantageous for Latin American traffic. The compatibility of Gulf domestic shipping networks married to short sea trade routes with the Caribbean and Central America offer special advantages. The U.S. Gulf ports, particularly the eastern ones, have advantageous positions for trans-Gulf, short sea commerce with Mexico. Tampa is the closest U.S. port to Havana. All Gulf ports are logical trading partners with the Caribbean and Latin American nations. The West Gulf ports offer special advantages with their proximity to the Mexican border and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. Thus while the contemplated domestic shipping systems are important concepts to ally with the other modes and meet the 2x3x challenge for internal U.S. commerce, the compatibility of such domestic systems with the present and future Latin American trade routes is a most conspicuous side benefit and opportunity.
Cautions
Carrying containers on inland barges or trailers on coastwise ships is anything but a new idea. Since no one apparently has kept a record of the number of times that such ventures have failed in the past decades, it can be said that they have been tried countless times. There have been some successes, most notably in Europe and the Pacific Northwest. Notwithstanding these few, many experienced maritime executives have understandable prejudices about the efficacy of container-on-barge or coastwise shipping. "It's been tried. It won't work," they proclaim with excellent hindsight. Obviously, it does work-but only under the right circumstances. The projected difference between conventional transportation capacity and future demand introduces a new variable that virtually guarantees that it must work. The real question is, “how well will we make it work?” For those who advocate just letting it happen with minimum coordination, some hindsight into the modern port system may be useful.
Today, the ubiquitousness of port authorities is taken for granted, but, based upon the history of maritime affairs, such organizations are relatively quite new. In the United States the first port authorities were created on the West Coast as a result of the Gold Rush and the subsequent rapid development when demand for marine terminals had far exceeded the capacity (a 19th century 2x3x). Waterfront operators rushed to fill the gap but the end result was shoddy, unsafe terminals, as well as inefficiency, congestion, and disorder. To counter these ills, port authorities were created, bringing about the professionalism, order, and planning we take for granted today.
From the above, two caveats can be identified: First, it follows that planning and orderly development for domestic short-sea shipping and container-on-barge will best serve the nation and the industries. Disjointed development will produce mistakes and redundancies that will ultimately require replacements. Second, any premature experiments in setting up new systems that result in failure will harden the prejudice that exists against waterborne domestic shipping.
It can be noted that in the year 2000 many GRIP members favored sponsorship of and co-funding for a study, appropriately named Plethora. It would have provided a planning tool to accurately define the challenges and prescribe the solutions. The proposed study would have examined in five-year increments the capacities of the land transportation system and the transportation demand. The excess demand presumably would translate into the freight that should be moved intermodally utilizing the maritime mode for the main haul. The proposed study floundered when the anticipated Federal funding mechanism did not materialize and a consensus could not be reached among the states.
Notwithstanding this setback, specific development of any segment of the envisioned new intermodal partnership will require supporting data. The 2x3x prediction/process is, at best, a generalization. Knowing the timeframes of infrastructure capacity and market demand is essential to rational development.
PLAN OF ACTION FOR CONSENSUS BUILDING FOR INTERMODAL NETWORK EFFICIENCY (ConBINE)
Long-term Objective
The long-range objective is the establishment of one or more regional Fed-eral/state/industry partnerships capable of interlocking the various levels and branches of government and industry to create a land/marine intermodal system that benefits all parties in view of the freight plethora created by the 2x3x factor.
Short-term Objective
As a provisional step, the Consensus Building for Intermodal Network Entities (ConBINE) process is carried out in regions (of two or more states) which enjoy potential maritime intermodal benefits to determine (1) if and when maritime intermodalism will be needed to ameliorate congestion and (2) if so, what will the logical roles and responsibilities of the Federal, state and local governments, port authorities, and private sector entities be.
Long-term Benefits
The long-term benefit must be the efficient utilization of an existing but underemployed transportation asset, the maritime sector, as a partner with the existing domestic, land transportation modes, thereby enhancing the reliability, efficiency, and ecological status of the overall transportation system.
National security would also benefit by (1) increasing the size of the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet and the mariner work force; (2) minimizing the potential for congestion in a national emergency mobilization when military surge freight volumes will be superimposed upon an overall transportation system at or near capacity with conventional freight volumes; (3) having a viable alternative in the event of terrorist-caused land mode disruptions; and (4) sustaining the defense-critical U.S. shipbuilding industry.
In order for the maritime mode to carry a meaningful amount of domestic cargo, there must be agreements and understanding among diverse parties. Thus there will be a need for agreements among beneficiaries ranging from Federal/states compacts to less formal understandings. ConBINEs can establish the rationality of such agreements in an orderly, timely manner.
Short-term Benefits
ConBINE allows for intermodal plans to be drawn up for appropriate geographical areas utilizing the indigenous expertise and focused upon the local needs while providing an eventual means of combining the efforts into a national network.
Steps
1. Initiating Organization
2. ConBINE Meetings
3. Implementation
PLAN OF ACTION FOR DOMESTIC AFFORDABLE VESSEL EFFORT (DAVE)
Objective
In view of the substantially larger volumes of freight generated by 2x3x, the objective is the determination of one or more means by which the domestically operated vessels needed can be acquired and profitably amortized by United States citizens in conformity with current U.S. laws.
Background
In order to be operated in the U.S. domestic trade, a vessel must be built in the United States. It is widely perceived that the purchase price of such a U.S.-built vessel is and will be a fatal financial impediment for American-flag water carriers. There are compelling national security and economic motivations which make repeal of the requirements unacceptable. The result is an apparent impasse.
Benefit
DAVE will explore alternatives within the existing legal frameworks and without recourse to direct subsidy. DAVE would create an opportunity for government and private sector executives to "think outside the box" and thereby hopefully resolve the impasse.
Steps
1. Submission and Endorsement
2. Initiating Organization
3. National DAVE Meetings
TERMS and ACRONYMS APPLICABLE TO THIS REPORT
2X3X Factor a doubling to tripling in 20 to 25 years of the demand for overall U.S. freight transportation services that has been in process since the mid 1990s in most modes and trades
blue water oceans and seas
brown water rivers and inland waterways
COB container on barge
ConBINE Consensus Building for Intermodal Network
deep water term used to denote capability of operation on the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes; i.e. deep water. While not definitive , deep navigational water depth is generally considered to be at least 25 feet deep
domestic trade trade between two points in a nation, as opposed to foreign trade
general cargo Freight that can be quantified by number of pieces, in contrast with bulk freight that is quantified only by weight or volume
GRIP Gulf\Rivers Intermodal Partnership (a coalition of the Federal, state, and local transportation officials and industry executives from states of Alabama, Arkansas, western Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas)
intermodal The transport of goods from origin to destination utilizing programmed technology for the carriage and transfer between two or more modes to achieve maximum overall efficiency
RMR Project Where the Rudders Meet the Roads
SDOT State departments of transportation
shallow waterTerm used to denote operations on the rivers and waterways; i.e., shallow water. While not definitive, shallow navigational water depth is generally considered to be at least eight feet deep.
Short sea Sea commerce between ports that are relatively close to one another, generally utilizing smaller, specialized vessels
unitized cargo General cargo carried in a unit, as in containers or trailers (and in some cases, on pallets)
vessel An all-inclusive term covering all types of crafts used to travel on water. For example, inland barges, towboats, and ships are all vessels.
WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS
GRIP TENN-TOM SUB-REGION 9/27/01 MEETING FEEDBACK
LEGEND:
NUMBERED = CONSIDERED HIGHEST PRIORITY
BULLETED (dot)= OTHER IDENTIFIED ITEMS
ASSETS
1. Inland Waterway System offers greatest capacity for meeting transportation demands and economic development (particularly rural)
2. Capacity available for domestic/international container movement
3. Waterways offer highest potential for reducing highway congestion; and infrastructure, maintenance, and construction costs of highways
4. Environmental benefits of waterway transportation proven by studies
5. Ocean port connectivity to inland ports
LIABILITIES
1.Lack of funds for infrastructure-e.g., replacement of some locks
2. Lack of recognition and knowledge of inland waterways (Tonnage criteria is misleading—suggest economic value)
3. No port improvement funding source
4. Bottlenecks on rail and highway modes
5. Creation of new infrastructure takes too long
NEEDS
Funding for:
creating jobs
varied cargoes
containers
backlogged maintenance
capital improvements
port infrastructure improvements—(key to improved waterway utilization)
Funding: Innovative
Incentives
for modes to work together
TENN-TOM (Continued)
Proponents in Congress:
Stronger Federal RoleStudy funded on impediments to container shipments and breakbulk constraints
Comprehensive Intermodalism Legislation
Inland/Ocean Ports Partnership
Resources
Governors-Champions
Chamber of Commerce
Congress
EDA, State Economic Development Agency
Federal DOT, State DOTS
Incentives-policy, tax
Industry
Regional Commissions
Targeted Financing--earmark
Trust Fund Surplus
WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS
GRIP WEST GULF SUB-REGION 10/24/01 MEETING FEEDBACK
LEGEND:
NUMBERED = CONSIDERED HIGHEST PRIORITY
BULLETED (dot) = OTHER IDENTIFIED ITEMS
ASSETS
1. Existing Container Flows; cargo waiting for maritime option
2. Excellent Port facilities including intermodal access (e.g., Gulf Intracoastal Waterway) in proximity to deep water
3. Air Quality Attainment (Environmental Rules)
4. Proximity to Mexico (Twin Plants)
5. Port Capacity Available
LIABILITIES
1. Perception - including ports under-utilized
2. Environmental – both perceived and actual
NEEDS
1. Educate, Promote Awareness, Market waterway mode system
2. Additional funds –
e.g., USACE for GIWW
e.g., FHWA for non-highway projects
e.g., state match
e.g., internships (DOT program)
3. Multi-modal freight-friendly infrastructure
WEST GULF (Continued)
1. Incentives to move freight on water – including legislation
A) Modern Container Handling Facility and Equipment
Storage Capacity – Barge Economic Order Quantity
Long Term Capital
Route I-69 for freight
Supplement to Houston
System Maintenance
RESOURCES
EDUCATION:
Congress
Secretary of Transportation
MARAD
State DOTs
MPO’s
Funding – Title XI for Ports
WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS
GRIP EAST GULF SUB-REGION 11/28/01 MEETING FEEDBACK
LEGEND:
NUMBERED = CONSIDERED HIGHEST
PRIORITY BULLETED (dot) = OTHER IDENTIFIED ITEMS
ASSETS
1. Gulf Coast deep draft ports—connections to inland waterway system. Multi-modal nature of gulf ports (hwy, rail, water, air)
2. Proximity to Cuba, Latin America, and the Caribbean—Trans-gulf shipping services (short sea)
3. Ports have land available for facilities
4. Ports taking foreign trade—(combining with) domestic trade network
5. Tourism—cruise ship business
LIABILITIES
1. No coordinating authority/plan to develop coastwise shipping
2. Intermodal north/south infrastructure
3. Nature of cargo: hi volume/low $ with unbalanced north/south trade
4A. Environmental constraints
4B. Public is not aware of the benefits/need of freight transport
NEEDS
EAST GULF (Continued)
RESOURCES
WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS
GRIP LOWER MISSISSIPPI
SUB-REGION 12/14/01 MEETING FEEDBACK
LEGEND:
NUMBERED = CONSIDERED HIGHEST PRIORITY
BULLETED (dot) = OTHER IDENTIFIED ITEMS
ASSETS (Numbered Items Prioritized)
1. Location to major domestic market for coalition
2. Infrastructure
3. Labor force/supply at “reasonable” wages-and stable
LIABILITIES (Numbered Items Prioritized)
1. No comprehensive plan for intermodal system
2. Lack of sufficient infrastructure funding
3. Difficult expandability of ports/environmental process
LOWER MISSISSIPPI (CONTINUED)
NEEDS (Numbered Items Prioritized)
1. Develop comprehensive regional intermodal system plans e.g., landside access and marketing/education
2. Identifiable source of infrastructure funding for all forms/types intermodal connections
3. Streamline environmental process
4. Central funding/coordinating system for intermodal development
WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS
GRIP MID-GULF SUB-REGION 1/11/02 MEETING FEEDBACK
LEGEND:
NUMBERED = CONSIDERED HIGHEST PRIORITY
BULLETED (dot) = OTHER IDENTIFIED ITEMS
ASSETS
1.The Mississippi River, Gulf Outlet, GIWW, and the Gulf of Mexico as unique assets in a sub-region
1. Basic infrastructure already exists
2. Good market
3. Terminals, roads, rail
4.Land available for development
1. Expertise in the Maritime industry
2. Excellent academic institutions-partnership with industry/study consults
3. Shipping, maritime expertise in large quantity--organizations and individuals
4. Existing human “know-how” in sufficient number(s)
1. Yard capacity at ports for empty & containerized cargo storage
1. Potential to build in/out new rail lines in partnership w/ports to expand capacity to move by rail
2. Numerous rail and interchange switching locations along the Mississippi River with the potential to expedite containers to and from barge.
3. Improvement needed in rail service component serving inland ports
MID-GULF
1. Combined with the inland intra coastal system two coastal gulf transportation shuttle system could be coordinated between inland ports and coastal ports
2. Waterways--both shallow and deep draft
1. More/better utilization of container cargo movements (regional--barge vs. truck)
2. There is existing “political will” to engage the issues
3. Huge amount of oil patch cargo travels by truck but could be barge shuttled system if a routine call were established.
LIABILITY
1. Aged locks and dams on inland waterway system
2. Need to improve locks on the Intercoastal Waterway--major bottleneck--major costs for improvements.
3. Existing highways
4. Outmoded intermodal connections rail/highway
5. Lack of connectivity between existing infrastructure
6. Infrastructure
7. Dredging and channel maintenance
1. Feds lacking “corridor” perspective--what strategic investments should be made along the MS River, GIWW?
2. Access to capital for infrastructure
3. Limited amounts of funds for development of port facilities
1. New environmental permits
2. Coastal land loss
3. Swamp/wetlands create construction challenges
4. MID-GULF (Continued)
5. Environmental pollution
6. Environmental restrictions
1. Lack of understanding of policy makers & legislative leadership for the need for investment
2. Public/private inertia to change
1. Lack of connectivity of existing infrastructure
2. Pressure by real estate development to add at-grade highway-rail crossings which reduces rail efficiency
1. Lack of connectivity of existing infrastructure
1. Expensive pilotage
1. No central authority in Louisiana. Six deep draft ports, eighteen shallow draft ports
1. Inadequate or insufficient market(s)
1 Politics, i.e., Louisiana business climate
2 Historically parochial thinking--competition instead of collaboration
3 Timeframe vs. cut-off times
4 Rail company-acquiring carriers
5 Fear of business loss from mode to move and competition within same modes for business
6 Aged rail and highway bridges interfere and constricting inland waterway commerce
7 Different views of investor risk in water transportation due to lack of understanding
NEEDS
1. Funding--new more flexible requirements--perhaps establish LA revolving land fund for freight
2. Increase funding through increase public & political awareness
3. Funds to build additional port facilities, I.e., docks, warehousing, roads, rail, utilities
4.Need to improve aging infrastructure--dedicated funding
5.Federal investment (Funds)
6. !!!Money!!!
7. Adequate funding to improve infrastructure needs/access
8. Need Federal funding sources that is independent of mode. Could be used on any infrastructure88
1.Increase government dialogue with private sector so that funding is available
2.Government & industry leadership to make the system (assets) work!
3. Broader understanding of the benefits & opportunities available through increased reliance on waterborne commerce
4. Need better work program &research agenda
5. Public policy incentives to utilize water transportation in lieu of highway and rail
6. Industry and political leadership to maximize assets
1. Extend connect rail & highway to lower Mississippi River
2. More efficient (specialized) rail and highway to ports/vessel Intermodal connectivity
1. No net increase of at grade-crossings--need federal rule
Where the Rudders Meet the Roads
Common/Considered Common Assets, Liabilities, and Needs
The following is a list of assets, liabilities, and needs deemed either common or considered common by participants of the five sub-regional meetings held by the Central Region's Gulf/Rivers Intermodal Partnership from October 2001 to January 2002:
COMMON ASSETS
1. The GRIP region's excellent port facilities including intermodal access (e.g., Gulf Intracoastal Waterway) in proximity to deep water
2. Gulf Coast deep draft ports—connections to inland waterway port system. Multi-modal nature of gulf ports (highway, rail, water, air)
3. The GRIP Region's numerous rail and interchange switching locations along the Mississippi River with the potential to expedite containers to and from barge.
COMMON LIABILITIES
1. No coordinating leadership/comprehensive plan for an intermodal system
2. Lack of sufficient infrastructure and infrastructure funding
3. Lack of public and/or shipper recognition
4. Inadequate or insufficient markets
5. Environmental constraints
COMMON NEEDS
1. Government and industry leading in partnership
2. Funding is needed for: creation of jobs, variation in cargo, containers, backlogged maintenance, capital improvements, port infrastructure improvements—key to improved waterway utilization.
3. Additional funding is needed for: the US Army Corps of Engineers for the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway; the US DOT Federal Highway Administration for non-highway projects; state match; and internships (DOT program).
4. Develop comprehensive regional intermodal system plans e.g., landside access and marketing/education
CONSIDERED COMMON ASSETS
1. Capacity available for domestic/international container movement
2. Environmental benefits of waterway transportation proven by studies
3. Air quality attainment (Environmental rules)
4. Proximity to Mexico
5. Port Capacity Available
6. Alternative to handle NAFTA flows (remove from congested highways)
7. Proximity to Cuba, Latin America, and the Caribbean—trans-Gulf shipping services (short sea)
8. Ports have land available for facilities
9.Location to major domestic market for coalition
10. Infrastructure in place
11.The Mississippi River, Gulf Outlet, GIWW, and the Gulf of Mexico as unique assets in a sub-region Basic infrastructure already exists
12. Good market
13. Land available for development
14. Yard capacity at ports for empty & containerized cargo storage
15. Potential to build in/out new rail lines in partnership w/ports to expand capacity to move by rail
CONSIDERED COMMON LIABILITIES
1. Lack of funds for infrastructure-e.g., replacement of some locks
2. Lack of recognition and knowledge of inland waterways (Tonnage criteria is misleading—suggest economic value)
3. Bottlenecks on rail and highway modes
4. Perception - including ports under-utilized
5. Environmental – both perceived and actual
6. I-69 potential to misroute
7. Competition for waterway funds
8. Intermodal north/south infrastructure
9. Public is not aware of the benefits/need of freight transport
10. Difficult expandability of ports/environmental process
11. Lack of intermodal access available including rural areas
12. Lack of connectivity between existing infrastructure
13. lacking perspective--strategic investments
14. Different views of investor risk in water transportation due to lack of understanding
CONSIDERED COMMON NEEDS
1. Education, promote awareness
2. Incentives to move freight on water
3. Coordinated regional intermodal freight policy and plan (steer the system)
4. Region intermodal freight plan
5.Transport plan policy—Gulf region
6. Get out word—freight does vote
7. Get out word—environmental advantages of water transportation system
8. Public education of entire maritime industry
9. Educate shippers, legislators, and general public on advantages of maritime included intermodal system
10. Broader understanding of the benefits & opportunities available through increased reliance on waterborne commerce
11. Need better work program & research agenda
12. Public policy incentive to utilize water transportation in lieu of highway and rail
WHERE THE RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS
INLAND WATERWAY SYSTEMS
UNIQUE ADVANTAGES
TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE WATERWAY SYSTEM
Alabama-Coosa Rivers : The Alabama-Coosa River basin is part of the extensive Mobile River basin, which also includes the drainage areas of Mobile, Tombigbee and Black Warrior Rivers. Its main streams are the Coosa, Tallapoosa and Alabama Rivers. Total mileage: 305, Project depth: 9 feet, Project width: 200 feet. (Ref. 1)
Black Warrior, Warrior and Tombigbee River System : The Black Warrior-Tombigbee Waterway lies wholly within the State of Alabama and is made up of the Black Warrior, Warrior and Tombigbee Rivers, including the Spisey, Mulberry and Locust Forks of the Black Warrior River. Total mileage: 466, Project depth: 9 feet, Project width: 200 feet. (Ref. 1)
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway : The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway is a connecting link between established water transportation routes that serve shippers and producers in the South and Midwest as well as deep water ports along the eastern Gulf of Mexico. This unique feature has already benefited commercial interests in 16 states since it opened for business in 1985.
The waterway begins at the northern end at Pickwick Lake on the Tennessee River, flows through northeast Mississippi and west Alabama, and finally connecting with the established Warrior-Tombigbee navigation system at Demopolis, Alabama. From there, commerce travels northward as far as Port Birmingham, Alabama or south to Mobile, Alabama, or other destinations along the Gulf coast. Total mileage: 234; Project depth: 9-12 feet. (Ref. 2)
Although the Tennessee-Tombigbee waterway system has nurtured development, considerable waterfront property remains along the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway for future development. This sub-region clearly has capacity available for domestic and international container movement in the primarily rural area.
LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER SYSTEM
Arkansas River Navigation System (McClellan-Kerr) : The route follows the White River and the Arkansas Post Canal to the Arkansas River, flows up the Arkansas River to the mouth of the Verdigris River to Catoosa, Oklahoma. Total mileage: 448, Project depth: 9 feet, Project width: 150 to 300 feet. (Ref. 1)
Lower Mississippi River : Mississippi River south of Cairo, Illinois, including the Ouachita, Arkansas, Red, Verdigris, White, and Yazoo River. At Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the deep draft ship channel begins. The 700-mile, lock-free main stem of the river system provides for the unparalleled economies of scale of water transportation. The River's ultimate destination is 100 miles south of New Orleans, Louisiana at the mouth of the Passes into the Gulf of Mexico. Total mileage: over 1100.
This sub-region has excellent geographical assets and well-developed infrastructure, and the need for the creation of a comprehensive intermodal plan.
GULF SYSTEM
Gulf Of Mexico : The Gulf of Mexico is the ultimate destination of all inland waterway systems in this report. Each system contributing in varying degrees to the transport of freight either to or from domestic inland origins and/or destinations. The deep-water ports are ideally located for Gulf domestic coastwise trade and trans-Gulf trade with Mexico, Cuba, Latin America, and the Carribean.
Intracoastal Waterway: The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW) extends from Apalachee Bay (St. Marks), Florida to Brownsville, Texas. Running parallel to the Gulf of Mexico, it traverses the three Gulf sub-regions, connecting each to the inland waterway systems and to each other for a Gulf alternative in the east/west transport of intermodal freight. Total mileage: 1113, Project depth: 12 feet, Project width: 125 feet. (Ref. 1)
For the purpose of the Where the Rudders Meet the Roads report, the Gulf of Mexico was arbitrarily broken down into three sub-regions:
East Gulf : The East Gulf includes the Alabama and Florida panhandles and the western half of the Florida peninsula. The Apalachicola, Chattahoochee and Flint River System, from the bay at Apalachicola, Florida to the confluence of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, the Chattahoochee River to Columbus, Georgia (268 miles), and the Flint River to Bainbridge, Georgia (29 miles), is a source for inland waterway freight transportation in this sub-region. The sub-region emphasized its proximity to Cuba and Latin America as facilitating short-sea trade to connect with the domestic trade.
Mid Gulf: The Mid Gulf extends from Galveston Bay to Mobile Bay. A growing container on barge service operates from Houston both as offshore coastwise (Gulf of Mexico) to New Orleans and as inshore (GIWW) to Lake Charles. In addition to the GIWW, Mississippi River, and Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, the sub-region's inland waterway assets include the Houston Ship Channel. The Channel connects Galveston Harbor opposite Port Bolivar with Houston, Texas, extending northwesterly across Galveston Bay through the San Jacinto River and Buffalo Bayou to a turning basin at Houston, Texas. Total mileage: 50, Project depth: 8 to 40 feet, Project width: 60 to 400 feet. (Ref. 1)
The offshore oil support activities centered in the Mid Gulf sub-region provide tremendous demand for transportation services across all modes. Emphasis in this sub-region was placed on the natural resources, infrastructure, and connections, and the lack of public recognition of the need to invest in transportation capacity.
West Gulf: The West Gulf extends from Brownsville, Texas to the immediate west of Galveston Bay. The proximity to Mexico has a huge impact upon the transportation network in this sub-region. Several of the deep-draft ports move international trade shipments with origins or destinations in Mexico. A container on barge service operates out of Houston, Texas that connects with Freeport, Texas.
1. The American Waterways Operators, Inc., Big Load Afloat, Washington, D. C., 1973.
2. Waterway Description and Components , Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway Association. Retrieved July 24, 2002 from http://www.tenntom.org.
Inland barges carry approximately 15 percent of the nation's freight at the lowest unit cost while offering an environmentally-sound alternative to other land modes.
Energy Efficiency
The measure of energy efficiency in transportation is the amount of energy used for the service provided, and can be expressed as the number of BTUs required to move one ton of cargo one mile (a-ton-mile). In studies comparing rail, truck, and water, shallow-draft water transportation has been proven to be the most energy efficient method of freight transportation for moving bulk raw materials.
An analysis of rail and waterway fuel efficiency show the average BTUs expended per ton-mile totals 433 for water transport, and 696 for rail transport. It is much more efficient to move cargo through water than over land.
Size is the key to water transport's efficiency. The capacity (1,500 tons) of an inland barge, which can carry five times its own weight, is impressive, and the industry as a whole has enormous capacity. The cargo capacity of a barge is 15 times greater than one rail car and 60 times greater than one semi trailer. To move the same amount of cargo transported by a standard tow (15 barges) would require a freight train 2 3/4 miles long or a line of trucks stretching more than 35 miles. On the lower Mississippi one 10,000-horsepower towboat can push 40 barges that have the carrying capacity of 600 railcars or more than 2,200 trucks.
Cargo Capacities
One barge carries 1,500 tons or 52,500 bushels or 453,600 gallons. One railcar carries 100 tons or 3,500 bushels or 30,240 gallons. One truck carries 25 tons or 875 bushels or 7,560 gallons.
Safety
Transporting cargo safely is an important measure of environmental responsibility, and water transport has very few accidents, fatalities, or injuries.
Shallow-draft water transportation has definite advantages over competitive modes; it generally involves less urban exposure than either truck or rail; operates on a system that has few crossing junctures; and is relatively remote from population centers, all factors that reduce both the number and impact of waterway incidents.
For the amount of tonnage carried, barge spills occur quite infrequently. Barges, because of their much larger capacity, require far fewer units than either rail or truck to move an equivalent amount of cargo, and so the chance of a spill is less likely. Also, design features of barges such as double-hulls and navigational aids help reduce accident frequency. Recent legislation requires all new inland tank barges carrying liquid cargoes to be built with both an inner and outer hull. However, for some time water transport operators have realized the need to protect the environment, and about two thirds of the inland tank barges that have been constructed in the last ten years have either a complete double hull, double sides, or a double bottom.
Construction of tank barges must be approved by the Coast Guard, and once in service, they are inspected annually. Coast Guard statistics show that water transportation not only is subject to a high degree of regulation, but also operates under a stringent regulatory program.
Minimizes Congestion
The steady increase in highway traffic in the U.S. has far outstripped any increase in infrastructure capacity, resulting in delays, safety problems, and congestion, costing the nation up to $100 billion annually.
The results of this congestion are reflected in more accidents, increased energy consumption, environmental damage, increased commuting times, and greater social tension. Water transport, in contrast, does not have congestion problems, and seldom causes them for others. The fact is, that far from being congested, the country's water transport system is under utilized.
Minimizes Air/Noise Pollution
Some of the most pervasive and intrusive sources of noise and air pollution are transportation systems.
Noise levels have been rising due to a number of reasons, with transportation activity the major source. Air pollution comes from a wide variety of man-made and natural sources, with fossil fuel combustion the largest contributor. Air pollution caused by transportation includes pollutants directly emitted by engines as well as secondary pollutants formed by chemical reactions.
Even though air pollution resulting from water transport operations is negligible, the waterway industry has been, and is, installing vapor control systems to capture any emissions. Cumulatively, the barge industry has a relatively minor effect on air quality, consumes much less energy (and as a result, produces less air pollution) per ton-mile of freight carried than either rail or truck. For the most part, waterway operations are conducted away from population centers, which reduce the impact of its exhaust emissions. Little data exists on noise levels of barge operations, mainly because they are not considered a problem. Towboats operate well away from shore, with the sound of their engines muffled below the water line, and any noise levels are hardly audible beyond the immediate area of the tow.
Positive Land Use/Social Impact
For the most part, inland river transport has little impact on densely populated areas. These shallow-draft vessels operate in mid-river, well away from shore, and because of the large tonnage moved at one time, tow passages are infrequent. This low-profile type of operation is one of the transportation industry's best kept secrets.
Since most of the right-of-way from water transport is provided by nature, inland navigation is less likely than other transport forms to compete with non-transportation uses for land area, an important consideration in urban locations. Apart from a few connections and waterside terminals, waterways preempt very little land.
When a new navigation project is completed, more than water transportation benefits. The other major beneficiaries of developed waterway systems include recreation, flood control, public water supply, wildlife habitat, irrigation, and industrial use. And oftentimes, the benefits of these other purposes are as important as the waterway itself - which is an economic spur to the particular region where it is located. Navigation not only creates opportunities for new industries, but may also change trade patterns that can have a major economic impact on local and regional development.
In addition to navigation, commercial waterway activity has been a good environmental neighbor. In the process of building waterway projects, provisions are made to preserve, enhance, or create wetland and aquatic habitats. National wildlife refuges and designated areas along the rivers are home to many species of fish and wildlife, and are used by both migratory and resident bird populations.
Conclusion
There is a growing national commitment to restoring and preserving our environment, a goal that has become a priority for the inland navigation industry.
The companies that make up the barge and towing industry have a reputation for a strong environmental stewardship and are dedicated to improving the compatibly of their operations with the environment in an effort to reduce environmental incidents to an absolute minimum. Pollution control, protection and enhancement of the environment, and maintenance of the ecological balance have long been major concerns of the waterway industry.
(Text adapted from Environmental Advantages of Inland Barge Transportation. Division of Domestic Trade, Maritime Administration.)
GRIP RUDDERS MEET THE ROADS
NATIONAL DEFENSE
Since the mid 1980’s, the US military has learned that the domestic water transportation system is a cost-effective mode for moving military equipment. The Military Traffic Management Command has found vessel operators able to meet the requirements for bidding and for successfully carrying out the transport mission including having sufficient deck barge availability.
The original impetus to experimenting with water transport was to move national guard unit equipment to Fort Chafee, AR when the national training center was located there. Since the training site was moved to Fort Polk, LA, opportunities for moving equipment have continued and actually increased. Examples of states generating military equipment moves are Indiana, Kentucky (Fort Campbell), Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma (Fort Sill), Texas (Fort Hood), and in May of 2002, Illinois.
Unit Transportation Officers have commented that the benefits of moving by water include: delivery dates (transit times) surprisingly close to rail; reduced equipment damage; training benefits from vessel loadout and offload operations; improved equipment security; and lower cost.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has utilized specialized barges to move booster rockets by barge. First, the rockets are shipped to Stennis Space Center, MS for testing and then to Kennedy Space Center, FL for launching. This can be expected to continue. Boeing now produces rockets at a Tennessee River plant in northeast Mississippi. The MV Delta Mariner, now homeported in Pensacola, FL, was purposely constructed to carry the rockets on the inland waterways and oceans to Cape Canaveral. These shipments can also be expected to continue. The US Transportation Command planners have recently shown interest in the Delta Mariner due to her unique capabilities.
The GRIP states have numerous facilities that have utilized the marine transportation system to move equipment. Other facilities that can be anticipated to diversify to water by the 2020-2025 time frame include (in addition to those mentioned above): Anniston Army Depot, AL; Redstone Arsenal, AL; Fort Rucker, AL; Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR; Hurlburt Field, FL; Fort Benning, GA (via the Apalachicola River); Naval Construction Battalion Center (MS); McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (OK); and Milan Army Ammunition Plant (TN).
COMPARISON OF THE BENEFITS OF INLAND WATERWAY AND SHORT SEA FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION
VERSUS
LANDSIDE FREIGHT
TRANSPORTATION
With the prediction of the doubling of trade by the year 2020, it has become apparent that capacity issues must be addressed now in order to accommodate the ever-increasing demand on the U.S. transportation system.
Parameters for this study include infrastructure: the I-10/I-12 interstate corridor segment beginning immediately west of Houston, Texas at Katy and ending immediately east of Mobile, Alabama at Spanish Fort for the highway segment, and the Mississippi River from the mouth of the river to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Also included in the study are articulated tug/barge vessels and austere ports for a domestic short sea freight transportation operation.
Based on research findings, it is deemed economically beneficial to use our natural and man-made waterways, e.g., Mississippi River, Ten-nessee-Tombigbee Waterway, Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, and Gulf of Mexico, to accommodate increased demand. Basis of determination: inland waterway and short sea freight transportation are alternative avenues for freight transportation at a fraction of the cost of building and maintaining a land-side highway (estimated annual maintenance dredging cost for the Mississippi River from the mouth of the river to Baton Rouge: $92 million). 1 Note: These “highways” are already being maintained for larger ocean-going vessels or are maintenance free.
In contrast, to add an additional lane (one in each direction) east and west, on the I-10/I-12 corridor from Katy, Texas to Spanish Fort, Alabama (a 500 mile span) it would cost approximately $12.5 Billion ($25 million x 500 miles = $12.5 billion) excluding maintenance.2 The $25 million per mile estimate is used because of the multi-state jurisdiction involved in this corridor project and unique conditions that must be addressed, e.g., the Atchafalya Basin segment and Mobile Bay tunnel.
In addition to the monetary factor in expanding capacity to meet predicted demand, there are other aspects in the equation: environmental constraints, highway congestion, safety, and landside space for transportation system development. The use of our waterways will alleviate pollution, protect and enhance the environment, and maintain an ecological balance.
A substantial amount of freight in the U.S. is already transported via water, however, unlike the European water freight transportation system, our waterways are significantly underutilized.
Water freight transportation is an alternative mode in the multi-modal system that alleviates congestion on our highways (one standard barge is equivalent to 58 large semis) and therefore is economically benefi-A viable vessel for inland waterway and short sea freight transportation is a roll on/roll off (Ro/Ro) articulated tug/barge vessel (ATB) service (tug connects to the barge with pivoting capability for stabilization purposes). This vessel would be self-sustained with a limited crew (the crew remains with the vessel for the duration of the job). Service would be on a 24-hour basis to prevent congestion. The ATB cost is:
500 foot barge, 10,000 H.P. @ $30 million
500 foot barge, 7,000 H.P. @ $28 million
300 foot barge, 6,000 H.P. @ $20-23 million
The ATB concept, in which the pusher tug is fitted with a special coupling device, is gaining favor in North America and is being studied for possible employment carrying containers and Ro/Ro cargoes in Europe.3
The domestic short sea transportation operation envisioned consists of four tugs with several compatible barges so that the operation would be a continuous (24 hour operation) dedicated service. The advantage of the ATB is that the tug can detach the loaded barge at destination and pick up another loaded barge to be carried to another destination.
The vision also includes four simple ports (Ro/Ro ramps included) strategically placed from Mobile, Alabama to Houston, Texas. This terminal would not have storage facilities--freight would be on trailers that would immediately roll off the ATB and continue to their destination. The conceptual cost estimate of a new 40 acre containerized cargo terminal is $32,000,000.4 A smaller port would cost substantially less.
In conclusion, to start up a domestic short sea freight transportation service, the cost is substantially less than the alternative: constructing additional lanes on the I-10/I-12 corridor between Spanish Fort, Alabama and Katy, Texas. Four ATBs @ 30 million each = $120 million; four ports @ 32 million each = $128 million; four additional barges @ 12 million each = $48 million. This cost is approximately $300 million in contrast to approximately $12.5 billion.
1 US Army Corps of Engineers, Maintenance Dredging Program, New Orleans District (added 2% per year for five years to average figure of $83.5 million [83.5 million x .10= $92 million]).
2 Eric Kalivoda, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, GRIP interview, conducted March 4, 2002 by Susan Schaefer, US-DOT/Maritime Administration, for the Where the Rudders Meet the Roads report. (He estimated $25 million per mile for the Atchafalya Basin segment of the I-10/I-12 corridor.)
3 WorldCargo Online News, May 2001.
4 Latin American Trade & Transportation Study, Port Conceptual Development Cost Estimates, 2000.
Where The Rudders Meet the Roads
Participants
Alphabetical Listing
NAME
*NEXUS-SUB-REGION=BOLDED TEXT
|
1. Ms. Ginger E. Adam 2. Mr. Paul Adams 3. Mr. David E. Anderson 4. Colonel Tom Atkinson, CPA 5. Mr. Tom Bartkiewicz 6. Mr. Johnny Bellis 7. Mr. Eugene Bishop 8. Mr. Harry Blazek 9. Mr. Jerry Bobo 10. Mr. Chuck Boyd 11. Mr. Bob Buchanan 12. Mr. Harold Burdine 13. Mr. Raymond Butler 14. Mr. John P. Carey 15. Mr. John W. Carnes 16. Mr. Glen L. Cheatham, Jr. 17. Lieutenant Wayne Clayborne 18. Mr. Marlin D. Collier 19. Ms. Carolyn E. Cook 20. Mr. Dennis Cook 21. Mr. R. C. Cornelison 22. Mr. Richard Couch 23. Mr. Jim Davis 24. Mr. Gregory A. Deakle 25. Mr. Wayne Dennis 26. Captain George E. Duffy 27. Mr. Huey Dugas 28. Mr. Ted M. Falgout 29. Ms. M. J. Fiocco 30. Mr. Gerald P. Fraiser 31. Mr. Wyly Gilfoil 32. Mr. Jay G. Hardman P. E. 33. Mr. John Hardy 34. Mr. Howard W. Hawthorne 35. Mr. Jimmy Heidel 36. Mr. Dean Hinton 37. Mr. John W. Holt 38. Mr. J. Richard (Rich)Hommrich 39. Mr. H. Steve Jackson 40. Mr. Greg Johnson 41. Ms. Jan Jones 42. Dr. Eric I. Kalivoda 43. Mr. Lawrence Kastner 44. Mr. John La Rue 45. Mr. Charlie P. Lewis 46. Mr. Vip D. Lewis |
47. Mr. Jim Loew 48. Mr. David Long 49. Mr. Mark McAndrews 50. Ms. Sherri McConnell 51.Mr. Don C. McCrory 52. Dr. Deirdre McGowan 53. Mr. Cliff McKinney 54. RADM Williiam T. McMullen PhD 55. Mr. Tom Michie 56. Mr. Ray Miller, Jr. AICP 57.Mr. Dwight Minton 58. Mr. Ted Mosley 59. Mr. James Murphy 60. Mr. Pat Murphy 61. Mr. Stephen J. Ondrejas 62. Mr. Virgil Page 63. Mr. W.G. (Butch) Palmer, Jr. 64. Mr. G. Wayne Parrish 65. Ms. Karen Parsons 66. Mr. Kenneth E. Perret 67. Mr. Tommy Pitts 68. Mr. Charles Porter 69. Mr. Ed Preau 70. Mr. A. Philip Prejean 71. Mr. Robert D. Radics 72. Mr. PauL Revis 73. Mr. Roger P. Richard 74. Mr. German Rico 75. Mr. Pat Robbins 76. Mr. Tony Rodriquez 77. Mr. Benny Rousselle 78. Mr. Jerry Sailors 79. Mr. Rich Saucer 80. Ms. Susan E. Schaefer 81. Mr. Charles Spivey 82. Ms. Karen St. Cyr 83. Mr. Les Stuart 84. Ms. Fawn Thompson 85. Mr. Urban Treuil 86. Mr. Don Waldon 87. Mr. Ed Watson 88. Ms. Christi Webb 89. Mr. George T. Williamson 90. Mr. Michael G. Wilson 91. Ms. Maggie Woodruff 92. Mr. David Work |
Where The Rudders Meet the Roads
Participants
Sorted by Nexus
*NEXUS=BOLDED TEXTNAME
SUB-REGION
|
1. ACADEMIC 2. ACADEMIC 3. CONSULTANT 4. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 5. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 7. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 8. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 9. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 10. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 11.FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 12.FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13.FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 14.FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 15.FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 16. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 17. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 19. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 20. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 21. LAW 22. LOGISTICS 23. MARITIME 24. METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION 25. METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION 26. METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION 27. METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION 28. METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION 29. NON PROFIT 30. NON PROFIT 31. NON PROFIT 32. NON PROFIT 33. PORT 34. PORT 35. PORT 36. PORT 37. PORT 38. PORT 39. PORT 40. PORT 41. PORT 42. PORT 43. PORT 44. PORT 45.PORT 46. PORT |
47. PORT 48. PORT 49. PORT 50. PORT 51. PORT 52. PORT 53. PORT 54. PORT 55.PORT 56.PORT 57. PORT 58. PORT 59. PORT 60. PORT 61. PORT 62. PORT 63. PORT 64. PORT 65. PORT 66. PORT 67. PORT 68. PORT 69. PORT 70. PORT 71. RIVER ORGANIZATION 72. RIVER ORGANIZATION 73. RIVER ORGANIZATION 74. RIVER ORGANIZATION 75. RIVER ORGANIZATION 76. RIVER ORGANIZATION 77. RIVER ORGANIZATION 78. SHIPPING 79. SHIPPING 80. SHIPPING 81. STATE GOVERNMENT 82. STATE GOVERNMENT 83. STATE GOVERNMENT 84. STATE GOVERNMENT 85. STATE GOVERNMENT 86. STATE GOVERNMENT 87. STATE GOVERNMENT 88. STATE GOVERNMENT 89. STATE GOVERNMENT 90. STATE GOVERNMENT 91. STATE GOVERNMENT 92. STATE GOVERNMENT |
Where The Rudders Meet the Roads
Participants
Sorted by SUB-REGION
SUB-REGION=BOLDED TEXT
NAME
NEXUS
|
1. ALL 2. ALL 3. EAST GULF 4. EAST GULF 5. EAST GULF 6. EAST GULF 7. EAST GULF 8. EAST GULF 9. EAST GULF 10. EAST GULF 11. EAST GULF & MID GULF 12. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 13. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 14. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 15. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 16. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 17. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 18. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 19. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 20. LOWER MISSISSIPPI 21. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
22. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
23. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
24. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
25. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
26. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
27. LOWER MISSISSIPPI
28. LOWER MISSISSIPPI & TENN TOMBIGBEE
29. MID GULF
30. MID GULF
31. MID GULF
32. MID GULF
33. MID GULF
34. MID GULF
35. MID GULF
36. MID GULF
37. MID GULF
38. MID GULF
39. MID GULF
40. MID GULF
41. MID GULF
42. MID GULF
43. MID GULF
44. MID GULF
45. MID GULF
46. MID GULF |
47. MID GULF
48. MID GULF
49. MID GULF
50. MID GULF
51. MID GULF
52. MID GULF
53. MID GULF
54. MID GULF
55. MID GULF
56. MID GULF
57. MID GULF, WEST GULF, & EAST GULF
58. TENN TOMBIGBEE
59. TENN TOMBIGBEE
60. TENN TOMBIGBEE
61. TENN TOMBIGBEE
62. TENN TOMBIGBEE
63. TENN TOMBIGBEE
64. TENN TOMBIGBEE
65. TENN TOMBIGBEE
66. TENN TOMBIGBEE
67. TENN TOMBIGBEE
68. TENN TOMBIGBEE
69. TENN TOMBIGBEE
70. TENN TOMBIGBEE
71. TENN TOMBIGBEE
72. TENN TOMBIGBEE
73. TENN TOMBIGBEE
74. TENN TOMBIGBEE
75. TENN TOMBIGBEE
76. TENN TOMBIGBEE
77. TENN TOMBIGBEE & LOWER MISSISSIPPI
78. TENN TOMBIGBEE & LOWER
79. WEST GULF
80. WEST GULF 81. WEST GULF
82. WEST GULF
83. WEST GULF
84. WEST GULF
85. WEST GULF
86. WEST GULF
87. WEST GULF
88. WEST GULF
89. WEST GULF
90. WEST GULF
91. WEST GULF
92. WEST GULF |
Comments & Notes